Economic Analysis of law
Tuyển tập nghiên cứu về phân tích luật pháp bằng lý thuyết kinh tế
Dưới đây là mấy tài liệu Ngữ sưu tập được về chủ đề này. Sau đó là phần giới thiệu các bài nghiên cứu có liên quan mà Ngữ vô tình đọc được bắt đầu từ hôm nay (7/4/2021). Nhiều bài Ngữ chỉ đọc qua tóm tắt và đưa thên đây mà chưa kịp đọc hết. Click vào đề mục để tải từ nguồn chính chủ. Mong hữu ích.
Law and Economics (Berkeley Law, Cooter & Ulen, 6th ed, 2016) [Book]
The Economic Analysis of Law (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2017)
Economic Analysis of Law (Harvard Law School and National Bureau of Economic Research, Kaplow & Shavell, 1999)
A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics (Yale, Jolls et al., 1998)
The Law and Economics of Contract Interpretation (Richard Posner, 2004)
Economic Analysis of Contract Law (Steven Shavell, Harvard, 2003)
Economic Analysis of Contract Law after Three Decades: Success or Failure? (2002)
and many more here (Richard Posner), here (Chicago Unbound), Private Law Theory, and here (Oxford University Press).
Online free course
Learn Economics, Understand Your World (Marginal Revolution University)
Global History of Capitalism (on edX)
Free e-book
Principles of Economics (OpenStax)
See more with briefed summaries right below.
(9/2/2022)
The Economic Analysis of Civil Law (One free chapter)
This comprehensive textbook provides a thorough guide to the economic analysis of law, with a particular focus on civil law systems. It encapsulates a structured analysis and nuanced evaluation of norms and legal policies, using the tools of economic theory.
Business Law and Economics for Civil Law Systems (One free chapter)
(06/11/2021)
The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI): What Will it Look Like in the Future? [This may also be relevant: Special Issue: Dispute Settlement in the Belt and Road Initiative (2020)]
The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), as the main element of China's foreign policy, has undergone significant changes since it was first launched in 2013. However, there is no research yet on how it might evolve in the future, especially with the impacts of current developments such as the COVID-19 crisis and global power shifts. We aim to address this gap and present the first systematic qualitative future analysis with 4 proposed scenarios of the BRI, based on 39 expert interviews. Our analysis might help political and private sector decision-makers around the world anticipate developments and prepare their responses, as well as provide an academic contribution for conceptualising the BRI, e.g., for scholars who might aim to quantify future BRI impacts
(29/10/2021)
Can anyone really own virtual tokens such as Bitcoin and Ether? And if so, how should the law protect the rights of the owner? Legal rulings in federal courts have yielded inconsistent policies regarding the applicable remedy when rights in cryptocurrencies are infringed. Some adopt a property rule, granting injunctions and enforcement of property rights against third parties, whereas others restrict the remedy to damages. However, all rulings share one problematic feature: a lack of distinction between types of crypotokens, resulting in an implicit, one-size-fits-all policy. The economic analysis of law suggests that the choice between a property rule and a liability rule should depend on transaction costs, but such costs typically differ across cryptotokens because cryptotokens are diverse and customizable. Thus, this Article proposes to exploit the common taxonomy of cryptotokens, which distinguishes between security, utility, and currency tokens, as a proxy for transaction costs.
(10/10/2021)
The law of restitution and unjust enrichment has emerged as an important and independent branch of private law. However, it has attracted relatively little economic analysis. The aim of this paper is to develop a general conceptual framework for the economic analysis of the core example of restitution - mistaken payments. Our framework distinguishes between scenarios with unilateral and bilateral harms from mistakes, and unilateral and bilateral precaution by payers and recipients. Using this taxonomy, we develop a formal model in a parsimonious setting with two buyer-seller pairs. This model generates several novel insights, based on the idea that mistaken payments impose a “transaction tax” on contracting parties. It implies that full restitution is socially optimal when harm is unilateral (i.e., when a mistaken payment harms only the payer). When harm is bilateral (i.e., the recipient would suffer net harm from receiving the payment and making full restitution), partial restitution is generally optimal. However, we propose a hypothetical decoupled regime that would (if it were feasible) lead to more efficient outcomes than would partial restitution. The decoupling regime is intended as a thought experiment that can arguably shed light on some of the foundational debates surrounding the law of restitution.
(8/10/2021)
The economic analysis of law assumes that court decisions are key to incentivizing people and maximizing social welfare. This Article reviews the behavioral literature on court decision making, and highlights numerous heuristics and biases that impact judges and jurors and cause them to make decisions that diverge from the social optimum. In light of this review, the article analyzes some of the institutional features of the court system that may help minimize the costs of biased decisions in the courts.
(6/9/2021)
In this paper, we explain the methodological shifts that have occurred over time in the study of company law. Our hypothesis is that comparative company law has developed and evolved as a bridge between two extremes. On the one hand, the doctrinal, black-letter law approach to company law, dominant in academic commentary at the domestic level. On the other hand, the instrumental, analytic approach of the law and economics view of company law. As we will see, the evolution of the comparative approach to company law has seen frequent rebranding, from comparative corporate law, to comparative corporate governance, to law and finance and to theory and empirics of comparative corporate law. These re-branding waves have taken place as new questions, in need of different levels of analysis and methodological approaches, arose. Interestingly, in a two-way road, the comparative perspective has also enriched the L&E view of company law.
(01/09/2021)
The law of restitution and unjust enrichment has emerged as an important and independent branch of private law. However, it has attracted relatively little economic analysis. The aim of this paper is to develop a general conceptual framework for the economic analysis of the core example of restitution - mistaken payments. Our framework distinguishes between scenarios with unilateral and bilateral harms from mistakes, and unilateral and bilateral precaution by payers and recipients. Using this taxonomy, we develop a formal model in a parsimonious setting with two buyer-seller pairs. This model generates several novel insights, based on the idea that mistaken payments impose a “transaction tax” on contracting parties. It implies that full restitution is socially optimal when harm is unilateral (i.e., when a mistaken payment harms only the payer). When harm is bilateral (i.e., the recipient would suffer net harm from receiving the payment and making full restitution), partial restitution is generally optimal. However, we propose a hypothetical decoupled regime that would (if it were feasible) lead to more efficient outcomes than would partial restitution. The decoupling regime is intended as a thought experiment that can arguably shed light on some of the foundational debates surrounding the law of restitution.
(30/8/2021)
This article analyzes the socio-economic and political contexts behind the 2013 Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (2013 Constitution), in which demands for deeper institutional reform emerged in Vietnam, and explains the constitutional discourse within Vietnam as to its economic order. Diverse forces and platforms within Vietnam’s party-state and beyond have contributed to the exchange of ideas and values on the economic order. As a result of this public discourse, the provisions on the economic order of the 2013 Constitution are ideological compromises, reflecting the contradicting views within the party-state and society in Vietnam on the role of the market, private property, and the freedom to conduct business. The 2013 Constitution has taken a step towards a free market economy by recognizing the decisive role of the market in the national economy. It emphasizes the importance of the private sector and promises that it will be treated fairly among all other economic sectors. From this perspective, the 2013 Constitution contains the seeds of future political and legal guarantees which could protect individual liberties. However, in line with the socialist ideology adopted by its predecessors, the 2013 Constitution reaffirms the dominance of the public sector and the leading role of state-owned enterprises, and preserves the ambiguous “ownership of the entire Vietnamese people of land and natural resources”. Due to this ambiguity, the 2013 Constitution fails to lay down the foundations for far-reaching comprehensive institutional reforms that Vietnam urgently requires.
(29/4/2021)
Law and economics has failed to produce plausible descriptive theories of contract doctrines. This paper documents these failures and suggests that they are due to a methodological problem involving the concept of transaction costs. If transaction costs refer to writing or information costs, then rational individuals would agree to complex contracts that are not in fact observed, and contract law would, for the most part, have no other function than that of specifically enforcing contracts. If transaction costs refer to limits on foreseeability and other cognitive restrictions, then law and economics assumes implausibly both that people are rational enough to allow legal rules to influence their investment and breach decisions, but not rational enough to allow legal rules to influence contractual design. Implications for normative analysis are discussed, and non-economic approaches to contract law are surveyed and criticized.
(15/4/2021)
Law and Economics [The Oxford Handbook on The New Private Law (2020)]
Law and economics has had a significant impact on foundational private law subjects — property, contracts, and torts — as well as advanced private law areas. This chapter analyzes how law and economics influences private law and how New Private Law (NPL) is influencing law and economics. After a brief introduction in Section I, Section II provides background on law and economics. Section III focuses on property, contracts, and torts. For each area, this section distinguishes three generations of scholarship in law and economics, discusses the major ideas that economic analysis has contributed to private law, and surveys contributions of the NPL. Section IV briefly discusses the impact of law and economics on advanced private law areas such as business associations, trusts and estates, and intellectual property. Section V concludes by focusing on future directions in NPL and economics, including recent scholarship that takes seriously both the law and the effects of law.
(7/4/2021)
Whenever a rule is contractible, the law must establish separate rules governing how private parties can contract around the default legal treatment. To date, contract theorists have not developed satisfying theories for how to set “altering rules,” the rules that establish the necessary and sufficient conditions for displacing a default. This Article argues that when setting altering rules, efficiency-minded lawmakers should consider the costs of altering, the costs of various kinds of error, and the possibility that altering can impose negative externalities on others. There are two broad reasons for structuring altering rules that deviate from merely minimizing the transaction cost of altering. First, the Article develops conditions in which minimizing the costs of party error (especially nondrafter error) and third-party error (especially judicial error) will be paramount….Second, when externality concerns or paternalistic concerns to protect the contractors themselves are insufficient to justify a full-blown mandatory rule, lawmakers might at times usefully impose “impeding” altering rules, which deter subsets of contractors from contracting for legally disfavored provisions.